Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'First Things First' and 'On Eternal and Immutable Morality'

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25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
If the soul were a tabula rasa, with no innate ideas, there could be no moral goodness or justice [Cudworth]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Senses cannot judge one another, so what judges senses cannot be a sense, but must be superior [Cudworth]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]
More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]
Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Sense is fixed in the material form, and so can't grasp abstract universals [Cudworth]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Keeping promises and contracts is an obligation of natural justice [Cudworth]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws [Cudworth]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
An omnipotent will cannot make two things equal or alike if they aren't [Cudworth]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
If the will and pleasure of God controls justice, then anything wicked or unjust would become good if God commanded it [Cudworth]
The requirement that God must be obeyed must precede any authority of God's commands [Cudworth]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]