48 ideas
9136 | The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen] |
9131 | Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen] |
22317 | Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege] |
9139 | If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen] |
9140 | Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen] |
13455 | Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
16895 | The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge] |
3328 | Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
9179 | Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett] |
13473 | Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
9119 | No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen] |
9135 | We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen] |
3319 | Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
6076 | For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn] |
9871 | Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
16884 | Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge] |
9125 | Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen] |
9137 | Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen] |
3331 | If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege] |
16880 | Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge] |
8689 | Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend] |
5657 | Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton] |
9116 | Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen] |
9132 | An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen] |
3318 | Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
16885 | To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge] |
9128 | It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen] |
9130 | Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen] |
16887 | Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge] |
16894 | An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge] |
9118 | The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen] |
9124 | We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen] |
9126 | Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen] |
12890 | That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee] |
12892 | Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee] |
9121 | Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen] |
16882 | The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege] |
5816 | Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
7307 | A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A] |
9134 | The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen] |
7309 | Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
7312 | 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A] |
9133 | Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen] |
7725 | 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner] |
7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
9129 | I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen] |
9122 | God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen] |
3307 | Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |