38 ideas
22317 | Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege] |
13455 | Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
16895 | The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge] |
3328 | Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
9179 | Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett] |
13473 | Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
6076 | For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn] |
3319 | Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
9871 | Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
16884 | Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge] |
3331 | If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege] |
16880 | Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge] |
8689 | Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend] |
5657 | Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton] |
16639 | Only individual bodies exist [Bacon] |
16033 | There are only individual bodies containing law-based powers, and the Forms are these laws [Bacon] |
3318 | Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
16885 | To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge] |
20298 | The traditional a priori is justified without experience; post-Quine it became unrevisable by experience [Rey] |
16887 | Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge] |
16894 | An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge] |
16882 | The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege] |
21950 | Science must clear away the idols of the mind if they are ever going to find the truth [Bacon] |
5816 | Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
7307 | A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A] |
20300 | Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena [Rey] |
7309 | Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
7312 | 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A] |
7725 | 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner] |
20294 | 'Married' does not 'contain' its symmetry, nor 'bigger than' its transitivity [Rey] |
20293 | Analytic judgements can't be explained by contradiction, since that is what is assumed [Rey] |
20297 | Analytic statements are undeniable (because of meaning), rather than unrevisable [Rey] |
20301 | The meaning properties of a term are those which explain how the term is typically used [Rey] |
20302 | An intrinsic language faculty may fix what is meaningful (as well as grammatical) [Rey] |
20303 | Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity [Rey] |
7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
20299 | If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? [Rey] |
3307 | Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |