Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Thought: a Logical Enquiry', 'Structuralism' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
6859 Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
7740 There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
19466 The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
19465 There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
19468 The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
6862 Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
6858 Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
8921 Structuralism is now common, studying relations, with no regard for what the objects might be [Hellman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
8922 Maybe mathematical objects only have structural roles, and no intrinsic nature [Hellman]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
19470 Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
19471 A fact is a thought that is true [Frege]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
6863 Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
9877 Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
6861 What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
6860 How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
19469 We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege]
8162 Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett]
9818 A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
16379 Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
19467 A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
19472 A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege]