Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'works' and 'Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed)'

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23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
18806 Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
11022 Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934 [Gentzen, by Read]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
12394 If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11065 The inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning [Gentzen, by Hanna]
11023 The logical connectives are 'defined' by their introduction rules [Gentzen]
11213 Each logical symbol has an 'introduction' rule to define it, and hence an 'elimination' rule [Gentzen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
8490 First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8492 Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
10067 Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions beyond arithmetic [Gentzen, by Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8487 Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18899 Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
4028 Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14292 Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
8489 The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
18749 Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
17646 Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
9947 Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
10319 An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
8488 A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
9948 Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
4972 I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
4794 We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
8491 The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]