23 ideas
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
3338 | Numbers have been defined in terms of 'successors' to the concept of 'zero' [Peano, by Blackburn] |
5897 | 0 is a non-successor number, all successors are numbers, successors can't duplicate, if P(n) and P(n+1) then P(all-n) [Peano, by Flew] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
3546 | 'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas] |
3547 | Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas] |
3543 | Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas] |
3541 | Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas] |
3550 | Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas] |
3551 | Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas] |
3552 | If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas] |
3542 | We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |