40 ideas
19395 | Philosophy is sanctified, because it flows from God [Leibniz] |
12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
19394 | Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz] |
12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |