26 ideas
| 18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
| 8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
| 8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
| 8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
| 18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
| 4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
| 8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
| 12756 | Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz] |
| 21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
| 12755 | Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz] |
| 21317 | Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler] |
| 21313 | If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler] |
| 21314 | Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler] |
| 21318 | If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler] |
| 12760 | Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz] |
| 9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
| 8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
| 12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
| 12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
| 11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
| 12758 | It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz] |
| 8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |
| 19408 | To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz] |