33 ideas
| 7740 | There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 11178 | The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K] |
| 19466 | The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege] |
| 19465 | There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege] |
| 19468 | The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege] |
| 18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
| 11175 | Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K] |
| 8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
| 8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
| 11176 | The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K] |
| 11174 | A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K] |
| 8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
| 19470 | Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege] |
| 18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
| 19471 | A fact is a thought that is true [Frege] |
| 4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
| 8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
| 9877 | Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 11177 | Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K] |
| 11173 | Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K] |
| 11179 | If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K] |
| 19469 | We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege] |
| 8162 | Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9818 | A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 16379 | Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege] |
| 9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
| 8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
| 19467 | A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege] |
| 19472 | A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege] |
| 8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |