Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'The Emergence of Probability' and 'Russell's Metaphysical Logic'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


32 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Gassendi is the first great empiricist philosopher [Hacking]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B]
Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B]
The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B]
For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Probability was fully explained between 1654 and 1812 [Hacking]
Probability is statistical (behaviour of chance devices) or epistemological (belief based on evidence) [Hacking]
Epistemological probability based either on logical implications or coherent judgments [Hacking]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
In the medieval view, only deduction counted as true evidence [Hacking]
Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence [Hacking]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
An experiment is a test, or an adventure, or a diagnosis, or a dissection [Hacking, by PG]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Follow maths for necessary truths, and jurisprudence for contingent truths [Hacking]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]