40 ideas
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
21059 | General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant] |
21061 | Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant] |
21060 | It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant] |
21062 | The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant] |
21071 | There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant] |
21063 | Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant] |
21068 | There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant] |
21069 | A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant] |
21070 | A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant] |
21067 | A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant] |
21064 | A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant] |
21066 | Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant] |
21065 | You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant] |
21072 | The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |