138 ideas
| 9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford] |
| 16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber] |
| 8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe] |
| 16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe] |
| 3722 | Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant] |
| 3738 | The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant] |
| 8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
| 8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
| 8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
| 8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe] |
| 8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe] |
| 8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe] |
| 8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe] |
| 8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe] |
| 8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe] |
| 8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe] |
| 8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe] |
| 9545 | Late in life Frege abandoned logicism, and saw the source of arithmetic as geometrical [Frege, by Chihara] |
| 8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe] |
| 8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe] |
| 8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe] |
| 8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe] |
| 8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe] |
| 8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe] |
| 8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe] |
| 8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe] |
| 8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe] |
| 8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe] |
| 8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe] |
| 8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe] |
| 8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe] |
| 8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe] |
| 13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff] |
| 8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe] |
| 8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
| 8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe] |
| 8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe] |
| 8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe] |
| 8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe] |
| 8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
| 8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
| 8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
| 16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe] |
| 8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe] |
| 8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe] |
| 8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe] |
| 8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe] |
| 8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe] |
| 8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe] |
| 16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe] |
| 8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe] |
| 8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe] |
| 8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe] |
| 8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
| 8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
| 15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe] |
| 16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe] |
| 16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe] |
| 8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe] |
| 8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe] |
| 3726 | The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant] |
| 8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe] |
| 3739 | Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant] |
| 3741 | We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant] |
| 3740 | We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant] |
| 5296 | Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
| 8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe] |
| 24011 | Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B] |
| 8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe] |
| 8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe] |
| 5074 | Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant] |
| 8024 | The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 22390 | Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant] |
| 9750 | We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 20160 | Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant] |
| 9749 | Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 7671 | Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 3720 | We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant] |
| 3717 | Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant] |
| 3712 | A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant] |
| 3725 | The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant] |
| 3733 | The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant] |
| 3736 | Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant] |
| 3544 | Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas] |
| 7674 | Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 21029 | Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel] |
| 7105 | If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman] |
| 7625 | We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant] |
| 3715 | Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant] |
| 20715 | It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant] |
| 4024 | Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant] |
| 3710 | The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant] |
| 3737 | The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant] |
| 3718 | Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant] |
| 3723 | There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant] |
| 3735 | Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant] |
| 3714 | Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant] |
| 5295 | Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
| 6695 | Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham] |
| 8028 | Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 3724 | A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant] |
| 8026 | Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 15673 | The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson] |
| 8068 | Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant] |
| 8025 | The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 8027 | I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 3728 | Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG] |
| 22008 | Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant] |
| 3719 | If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant] |
| 3762 | Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant] |
| 22009 | Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant] |
| 4413 | The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant] |
| 3716 | Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant] |
| 3727 | Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant] |
| 22050 | The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 6694 | Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant] |
| 3731 | Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant] |
| 4345 | For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse] |
| 4251 | If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant] |
| 16004 | If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant] |
| 3711 | Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant] |
| 3713 | The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant] |
| 3729 | Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant] |
| 4344 | Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant] |
| 3732 | Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant] |
| 7670 | Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 7591 | Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant] |
| 7673 | Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 3730 | Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant] |
| 8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe] |
| 8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe] |
| 3721 | We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant] |
| 8046 | We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre] |
| 20714 | God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B] |