Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Jourdain', 'Paradoxes: Form and Predication' and 'Against Structural Universals'

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22 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Saying 'they can become a set' is a tautology, because reference to 'they' implies a collection [Cargile]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege]