33 ideas
| 19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
| 19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
| 19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
| 19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
| 19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
| 19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
| 19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
| 18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
| 8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
| 8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
| 8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
| 18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
| 4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
| 8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
| 9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
| 8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
| 19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |
| 4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
| 23814 | Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil] |
| 23824 | Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil] |
| 23815 | We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil] |
| 23823 | Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil] |
| 23822 | We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil] |
| 23817 | We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil] |
| 23819 | Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil] |
| 23818 | We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil] |
| 23820 | People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil] |
| 23821 | Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil] |
| 23816 | Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil] |
| 8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |