37 ideas
22864 | Philosophy is the study and criticsm of cultural beliefs, to achieve new possibilities [Dewey] |
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
22873 | Liberalism should improve the system, and not just ameliorate it [Dewey] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
22869 | Knowledge is either the product of competent enquiry, or it is meaningless [Dewey] |
22867 | The quest for certainty aims for peace, and avoidance of the stress of action [Dewey] |
22870 | No belief can be so settled that it is not subject to further inquiry [Dewey] |
22866 | Mind is never isolated, but only exists in its interactions [Dewey] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
22872 | Liberals aim to allow individuals to realise their capacities [Dewey] |
22880 | The things in civilisation we prize are the products of other members of our community [Dewey] |
22879 | 'God' is an imaginative unity of ideal values [Dewey] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |
22877 | We should try attaching the intensity of religious devotion to intelligent social action [Dewey] |
22878 | Religions are so shockingly diverse that they have no common element [Dewey] |