Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston)' and 'Mind, Brain and the Quantum'

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44 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is the study and criticsm of cultural beliefs, to achieve new possibilities [Dewey]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it [Lockwood]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
There may only be necessary and sufficient conditions (and counterfactuals) because we intervene in the world [Lockwood]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
No one has ever succeeded in producing an acceptable non-trivial analysis of anything [Lockwood]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways? [Lockwood]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Liberalism should improve the system, and not just ameliorate it [Dewey]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
How does a direct realist distinguish a building from Buckingham Palace? [Lockwood]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge is either the product of competent enquiry, or it is meaningless [Dewey]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
Dogs seem to have beliefs, and beliefs require concepts [Lockwood]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
The quest for certainty aims for peace, and avoidance of the stress of action [Dewey]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
No belief can be so settled that it is not subject to further inquiry [Dewey]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism is a theory of meaning as well as of knowledge [Lockwood]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
Commonsense realism must account for the similarity of genuine perceptions and known illusions [Lockwood]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
Mind is never isolated, but only exists in its interactions [Dewey]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
A 1988 estimate gave the brain 3 x 10-to-the-14 synaptic junctions [Lockwood]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
How come unconscious states also cause behaviour? [Lockwood]
Could there be unconscious beliefs and desires? [Lockwood]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
Fish may operate by blindsight [Lockwood]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Can phenomenal qualities exist unsensed? [Lockwood]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If mental events occur in time, then relativity says they are in space [Lockwood]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Only logical positivists ever believed behaviourism [Lockwood]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges [Lockwood]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Perhaps logical positivism showed that there is no dividing line between science and metaphysics [Lockwood]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals aim to allow individuals to realise their capacities [Dewey]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
The things in civilisation we prize are the products of other members of our community [Dewey]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
We have the confused idea that time is a process of change [Lockwood]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
'God' is an imaginative unity of ideal values [Dewey]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
We should try attaching the intensity of religious devotion to intelligent social action [Dewey]
Religions are so shockingly diverse that they have no common element [Dewey]