19 ideas
8251 | The logical space of reasons is a natural phenomenon, and it is the realm of freedom [McDowell] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
12185 | Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge] |
8128 | Representation must be propositional if it can give reasons and be epistemological [McDowell, by Burge] |
19092 | There is no pure Given, but it is cultured, rather than entirely relative [McDowell, by Macbeth] |
8253 | Sense impressions already have conceptual content [McDowell] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
8254 | Forming concepts by abstraction from the Given is private definition, which the Private Lang. Arg. attacks [McDowell] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |