14 ideas
8447 | In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege] |
8448 | Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege] |
10185 | Set theory is the standard background for modern mathematics [Burgess] |
10184 | Structuralists take the name 'R' of the reals to be a variable ranging over structures, not a structure [Burgess] |
10189 | There is no one relation for the real number 2, as relations differ in different models [Burgess] |
10186 | If set theory is used to define 'structure', we can't define set theory structurally [Burgess] |
10187 | Abstract algebra concerns relations between models, not common features of all the models [Burgess] |
10188 | How can mathematical relations be either internal, or external, or intrinsic? [Burgess] |
13437 | A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois] |
16233 | Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois] |
14755 | Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider] |
16231 | Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley] |
8446 | We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege] |
8449 | Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege] |