Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'Ontological Dependence' and 'The Conquest of Happiness'

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
14255 We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
14250 Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
14259 Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
18806 Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
8490 First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8492 Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8487 Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
14253 An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18899 Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
14251 A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K]
14254 Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K]
14257 An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K]
14261 There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
4028 Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
8489 The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
14252 We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14256 How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
14258 Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
14260 An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
9947 Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
10319 An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
8488 A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
9948 Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
4972 I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
20180 A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life [Russell]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
20179 Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this [Russell]
20178 Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening [Russell]
20176 Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power [Russell]
20177 Boredom always involves not being fully occupied [Russell]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
8491 The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]