29 ideas
11178 | The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
11175 | Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
11176 | The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K] |
11174 | A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
11177 | Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K] |
11173 | Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K] |
11179 | If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |