Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge' and 'External and Internal Relations'

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21 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox
The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]