51 ideas
| 2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
| 17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
| 2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
| 4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
| 2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
| 18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
| 10537 | The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett] |
| 10542 | To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett] |
| 8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
| 8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
| 10554 | Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett] |
| 8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
| 10552 | Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett] |
| 18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
| 10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
| 10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
| 10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
| 10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
| 10548 | The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett] |
| 10281 | The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett] |
| 4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
| 10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
| 10534 | 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett] |
| 10541 | Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett] |
| 10545 | Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett] |
| 10555 | If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett] |
| 10543 | Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett] |
| 10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
| 10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
| 8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
| 10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
| 2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
| 6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
| 2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
| 2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
| 2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
| 2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
| 9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
| 8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10549 | Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett] |
| 2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
| 2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
| 2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
| 10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
| 4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
| 2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
| 2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |
| 8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |