21 ideas
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
8329 | Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
21947 | Power is localised, so we either have totalitarian centralisation, or local politics [Foucault, by Gutting] |
21946 | Prisons gradually became our models for schools, hospitals and factories [Foucault, by Gutting] |
8324 | The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley] |
8328 | Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley] |
8327 | If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley] |
8330 | Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley] |
8325 | The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |