Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'teachings' and 'The Raft and the Pyramid'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa]
Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
Nagarjuna and others pronounced the world of experience to be an illusion [Nagarjuna, by Armstrong,K]