21 ideas
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
13445 | Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
16774 | Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
7400 | Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck] |
4310 | We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes] |
6553 | Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
19676 | Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux] |
6518 | Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes] |
20365 | We only see points in motion, and thereby infer movement [Rescher] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |