28 ideas
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
14802 | Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce] |
23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
14800 | The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce] |
14801 | Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |