26 ideas
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
4608 | Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil] |
4880 | Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett] |
4873 | What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett] |
4881 | Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett] |
4875 | We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett] |
4879 | There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett] |
4876 | Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett] |
4878 | The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett] |
4874 | The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4882 | Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
23692 | Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions [Foot] |
4872 | Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett] |
4877 | Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |