Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives' and 'Ecce Homo'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
4424 A warlike philosopher challenges problems to single combat [Nietzsche]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
18806 Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
8490 First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8492 Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8487 Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18899 Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
4028 Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
8489 The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
9947 Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
10319 An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
8488 A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
9948 Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
4972 I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
22392 Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23685 Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
23691 Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
2886 The distinction between egoistic and non-egoistic acts is absurd [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
4426 A bad result distorts one's judgement about the virtue of what one has done [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
4425 The overcoming of pity I count among the noble virtues [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
22391 Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
22389 Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
20132 To become what you are you must have no self-awareness [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
20144 Eternal recurrence is the highest attainable affirmation [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
2889 One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil [Nietzsche]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
8491 The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
2887 I am not an atheist because of reasoning or evidence, but because of instinct [Nietzsche]