19 ideas
| 18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
| 10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
| 10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
| 8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
| 8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
| 10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
| 10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
| 8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
| 18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
| 16668 | Modes of things exist in some way, without being full-blown substances [Gassendi] |
| 4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
| 10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
| 8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
| 9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
| 8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
| 8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |