Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Function and Concept', 'Rules for the Direction of the Mind' and 'What is Philosophy?'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


46 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy is in a perpetual state of digression [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is a concept-creating discipline [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims at what is interesting, remarkable or important - not at knowledge or truth [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
The plague of philosophy is those who criticise without creating, and defend dead concepts [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology needs art as logic needs science [Deleuze/Guattari]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
One truth leads us to another [Descartes]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
'Eris' is the divinity of conflict, the opposite of Philia, the god of friendship [Deleuze/Guattari]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic hates philosophy, and wishes to supplant it [Deleuze/Guattari]
Logic has an infantile idea of philosophy [Deleuze/Guattari]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes]
I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes]
When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes]
We cannot judge the Cogito. Must we begin? Must we start from certainty? Can 'I' relate to thought? [Deleuze/Guattari]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
Concepts are superior because they make us more aware, and change our thinking [Deleuze/Guattari]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
Other people completely revise our perceptions, because they are possible worlds [Deleuze/Guattari]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Atheism is the philosopher's serenity, and philosophy's achievement [Deleuze/Guattari]