29 ideas
22087 | Philosophy fails to articulate the continual becoming of existence [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
5651 | Traditional views of truth are tautologies, and truth is empty without a subject [Kierkegaard, by Scruton] |
13338 | '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
13337 | A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
13335 | Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski] |
13336 | A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski] |
13339 | A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski] |
13340 | Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski] |
13341 | Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
22090 | For me time stands still, and I with it [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
9305 | The plebeians bore others; only the nobility bore themselves [Kierkegaard] |
5650 | Reason is just abstractions, so our essence needs a subjective 'leap of faith' [Kierkegaard, by Scruton] |
22095 | There are aesthetic, ethical and religious subjectivity [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
20747 | What matters is not right choice, but energy, earnestness and pathos in the choosing [Kierkegaard] |
22091 | Kierkegaard prioritises the inward individual, rather than community [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |
22088 | Faith is like a dancer's leap, going up to God, but also back to earth [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |