62 ideas
23027 | Ideals and metaphysics are practical, not imaginative or speculative [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
19023 | Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies [Vetter] |
23030 | Truth is a relation to a whole of organised knowledge in the collection of rational minds [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
19033 | Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates [Vetter] |
19032 | S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds [Vetter] |
19036 | The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible [Vetter] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
19034 | The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts [Vetter] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
19015 | Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational') [Vetter] |
19012 | The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality [Vetter] |
19024 | A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class [Vetter] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
19021 | I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter] |
19016 | We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....' [Vetter] |
19017 | Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised [Vetter] |
19014 | How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
19030 | Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important? [Vetter] |
19040 | We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality [Vetter] |
19008 | The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification [Vetter] |
19029 | It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p [Vetter] |
19028 | Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location [Vetter] |
19010 | All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects [Vetter] |
19013 | Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer [Vetter] |
19019 | Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties [Vetter] |
19022 | Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing) [Vetter] |
23705 | A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities [Vetter, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
19009 | Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it [Vetter] |
19027 | Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials [Vetter] |
19031 | There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'. [Vetter] |
19025 | Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions' [Vetter] |
19011 | If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter] |
19037 | Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter] |
23044 | All knowledge rests on a fundamental unity between the knower and what is known [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23034 | The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
19018 | Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances [Vetter] |
19020 | Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics [Vetter] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
23032 | What is distinctive of human life is the desire for self-improvement [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23033 | Hedonism offers no satisfaction, because what we desire is self-betterment [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23045 | Politics is compromises, which seem supported by a social contract, but express the will of no one [Green,TH] |
23050 | The ideal is a society in which all citizens are ladies and gentlemen [Green,TH] |
23052 | Enfranchisement is an end in itself; it makes a person moral, and gives a basis for respect [Green,TH] |
23036 | The good is identified by the capacities of its participants [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23039 | A true state is only unified and stabilised by acknowledging individuality [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23038 | People only develop their personality through co-operation with the social whole [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23040 | If something develops, its true nature is embodied in its end [Green,TH] |
19039 | The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter] |
19038 | Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ [Vetter] |
19026 | If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different? [Vetter] |
19041 | Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions [Vetter] |
23031 | God is the ideal end of the mature mind's final development [Green,TH] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |
23041 | God is the realisation of the possibilities of each man's self [Green,TH] |