22 ideas
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
8358 | There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist [Strawson,P] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
6413 | 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling] |
8354 | Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
8356 | The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P] |
4001 | The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones [Nagel] |
10430 | Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury] |
10448 | If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P] |
8355 | Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
8357 | If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |