40 ideas
1542 | Diogenes of Apollonia was the last natural scientist [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Simplicius] |
19215 | Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks] |
19205 | 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
19209 | Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks] |
19208 | The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
19207 | Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
19214 | In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks] |
489 | Each thing must be in some way unique [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
483 | Start a thesis with something undisputable [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
1544 | Perception must be an internal matter, because we can fail to perceive when we are preoccupied [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Theophrastus] |
24042 | The older Diogenes said the soul is air, made of the smallest particles [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
19217 | I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks] |
19203 | A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
19200 | Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks] |
19206 | 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks] |
19202 | Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks] |
19204 | True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks] |
19210 | The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks] |
19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks] |
19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks] |
19212 | Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks] |
19213 | We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks] |
5995 | Diogenes of Apollonia offered the first teleological account of cosmology [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Robinson,TM] |
484 | Everything is ultimately a variation of one underlying thing [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
488 | Air is divine, because it is in and around everything, and arranges everything [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
486 | Plants and animals can only come into existence if something fixes their species [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
485 | Things must retain their essential nature during change, or mixing would be impossible [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |