34 ideas
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
9550 | We only know relational facts about the empty set, but nothing intrinsic [Chihara] |
9562 | In simple type theory there is a hierarchy of null sets [Chihara] |
9572 | Realists about sets say there exists a null set in the real world, with no members [Chihara] |
9573 | The null set is a structural position which has no other position in membership relation [Chihara] |
9551 | What is special about Bill Clinton's unit set, in comparison with all the others? [Chihara] |
9549 | The set theorist cannot tell us what 'membership' is [Chihara] |
9571 | ZFU refers to the physical world, when it talks of 'urelements' [Chihara] |
9563 | A pack of wolves doesn't cease when one member dies [Chihara] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
9561 | The mathematics of relations is entirely covered by ordered pairs [Chihara] |
9552 | Sentences are consistent if they can all be true; for Frege it is that no contradiction can be deduced [Chihara] |
9553 | Analytic geometry gave space a mathematical structure, which could then have axioms [Chihara] |
10192 | We can replace existence of sets with possibility of constructing token sentences [Chihara, by MacBride] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
9559 | If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara] |
9566 | No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9568 | I prefer the open sentences of a Constructibility Theory, to Platonist ideas of 'equivalence classes' [Chihara] |
9547 | Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
9574 | 'Gunk' is an individual possessing no parts that are atoms [Chihara] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |