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All the ideas for 'works', 'Mr Strawson on Logical Theory' and 'Set Theory and Its Philosophy'

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50 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with [Quine]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD]
Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge]
Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn]
Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge]
Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A]
If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA]