Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Metaphysics of Modality', 'On the Genealogy of Ethics' and 'My Philosophical Development'

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51 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
Early Greeks cared about city and companions; later Greeks concentrated on the self [Foucault]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell]
Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell]
Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G]
Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G]
Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G]
The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G]
The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G]
We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Why couldn't a person's life become a work of art? [Foucault]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Greeks and early Christians were much more concerned about food than about sex [Foucault]