16 ideas
| 5745 | Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine] |
| 8720 | A logic is 'relevant' if premise and conclusion are connected, and 'paraconsistent' allows contradictions [Priest,G, by Friend] |
| 8789 | Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine] |
| 21566 | 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell] |
| 21567 | 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell] |
| 23457 | Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell] |
| 21556 | Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey] |
| 21568 | A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell] |
| 16966 | Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine] |
| 16965 | All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine] |
| 16963 | Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine] |
| 16964 | Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine] |
| 4216 | Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe] |
| 18966 | Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine] |
| 14490 | You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine] |
| 16961 | In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine] |