Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'What is so bad about Contradictions?', 'Mental Events' and 'Liberalism: the basics'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


41 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Someone standing in a doorway seems to be both in and not-in the room [Priest,G, by Sorensen]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
Rawls's theory cannot justify liberalism, since it presupposes free and equal participants [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
People with strong prior beliefs would have nothing to do with a veil of ignorance [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Societies need shared values, so conservatism is right if rational discussion of values is impossible [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
The universalism of utilitarianism implies a world state [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals value freedom and equality, but the society itself must decide on its values [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Modern libertarian societies still provide education and some housing [Charvet]
Liberalism needs people to either have equal autonomy, or everyone to have enough autonomy [Charvet]
Kant places a higher value on the universal rational will than on the people asserting it [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
Liberalism asserts maximum freedom, but that must be equal for all participants [Charvet]
Egalitarian liberals prefer equality (either of input or outcome) to liberty [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
Liberals promote community and well-being - because all good societies need them [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / f. Multiculturalism
Identity multiculturalism emerges from communitarianism, preferring community to humanity [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
For communitarians it seems that you must accept the culture you are born into [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Give by ability and receive by need, rather than a free labour market [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Allowing defamatory speech is against society's interests, by blurring which people are trustworthy [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
'Freedom from' is an empty idea, if the freedom is not from impediments to my desires [Charvet]
Positive freedom can lead to coercion, if you are forced to do what you chose to do [Charvet]
First level autonomy is application of personal values; second level is criticising them [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Mere equality, as in two trees being the same height, has no value at all [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Inequalities are worse if they seem to be your fault, rather than social facts [Charvet]
Money allows unlimited inequalities, and we obviously all agree to money [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
The rule of law is mainly to restrict governments [Charvet]
The 1689 Bill of Rights denied the monarch new courts, or the right to sit as judge [Charvet]
From 1701 only parliament could remove judges, whose decisions could not be discussed [Charvet]
Justice superior to the rule of law is claimed on behalf of the workers, or the will of the nation [Charvet]
The rule of law mainly benefits those with property and liberties [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
Welfare is needed if citizens are to accept the obligations of a liberal state [Charvet]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin]
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin]