Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'What is so bad about Contradictions?', 'Conditionals' and 'Propositions'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Someone standing in a doorway seems to be both in and not-in the room [Priest,G, by Sorensen]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
'¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson]
When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson]
(A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson]
Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson]
Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]