10 ideas
9123 | Someone standing in a doorway seems to be both in and not-in the room [Priest,G, by Sorensen] |
5044 | Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz] |
5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
3286 | An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel] |
5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
4883 | Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel] |
3287 | We can't be objective about experience [Nagel] |
4989 | Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel] |
5043 | To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz] |