Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'What is so bad about Contradictions?', 'Formal and Material Consequence' and 'Truthmakers'

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28 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Someone standing in a doorway seems to be both in and not-in the room [Priest,G, by Sorensen]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride]
Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride]
There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible [Read]
If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence [Read]
Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why? [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts [Read]
Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride]
Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read]