37 ideas
19323 | 'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy] |
19137 | We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy] |
17453 | The meaning of a number isn't just the numerals leading up to it [Heck] |
17457 | A basic grasp of cardinal numbers needs an understanding of equinumerosity [Heck] |
17448 | In counting, numerals are used, not mentioned (as objects that have to correlated) [Heck] |
17455 | Is counting basically mindless, and independent of the cardinality involved? [Heck] |
17456 | Counting is the assignment of successively larger cardinal numbers to collections [Heck] |
17450 | Understanding 'just as many' needn't involve grasping one-one correspondence [Heck] |
17451 | We can know 'just as many' without the concepts of equinumerosity or numbers [Heck] |
17459 | Frege's Theorem explains why the numbers satisfy the Peano axioms [Heck] |
17454 | Children can use numbers, without a concept of them as countable objects [Heck] |
17458 | Equinumerosity is not the same concept as one-one correspondence [Heck] |
17449 | We can understand cardinality without the idea of one-one correspondence [Heck] |
17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |