90 ideas
15682 | Even fairly simple animals make judgements based on categories [Gelman] |
15691 | Children accept real stable categories, with nonobvious potential that gives causal explanations [Gelman] |
15700 | In India, upper-castes essentialize caste more than lower-castes do [Gelman] |
15685 | Essentialism is either natural to us, or an accident of our culture, or a necessary result of language [Gelman] |
15684 | Children's concepts include nonobvious features, like internal parts, functions and causes [Gelman] |
15681 | Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman] |
15678 | Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity [Gelman] |
15683 | Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first [Gelman] |
15697 | Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories [Gelman] |
15687 | Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman] |
15679 | Essentialism comes from the cognitive need to categorise [Gelman] |
15698 | We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children [Gelman] |
15709 | Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman] |
15696 | Peope favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is [Gelman] |
15707 | There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman] |
17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
15703 | Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman] |
15708 | Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman] |
18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
15695 | Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman] |
15694 | Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman] |
15692 | People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman] |
20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
15680 | Folk essentialism rests on belief in natural kinds, in hidden properties, and on words indicating structures [Gelman] |
17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
15686 | Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman] |
15690 | Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman] |
17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
15688 | Categories are characterized by distance from a prototype [Gelman] |
17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |
15689 | Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman] |
15699 | Prelinguistic infants acquire and use many categories [Gelman] |
20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
15693 | One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman] |
15701 | Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman] |
20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |
15702 | Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman] |
15705 | Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman] |
15704 | Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman] |
15706 | A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman] |