10 ideas
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
18435 | Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round) [Rodriquez-Pereyra] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
7752 | Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice] |
7751 | Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice] |
7753 | We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice] |