36 ideas
| 23657 | The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid] |
| 6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
| 6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
| 23655 | An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid] |
| 6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
| 6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
| 6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
| 6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
| 6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
| 6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
| 6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
| 23659 | If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid] |
| 23662 | The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid] |
| 23661 | We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid] |
| 6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
| 23654 | In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid] |
| 23660 | The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid] |
| 6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
| 6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
| 17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
| 23658 | Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid] |
| 23656 | The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions [Reid] |
| 23653 | If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid] |
| 6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
| 7752 | Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice] |
| 7751 | Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice] |
| 7753 | We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice] |
| 6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
| 6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
| 6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
| 6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
| 6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
| 6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
| 6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
| 6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
| 23663 | There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face [Reid] |