Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Meaning', 'The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars' and 'Being and Nothingness'

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28 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8525 Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
22227 For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8518 Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8513 Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
8514 Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
8522 Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
8523 Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
8524 Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
8521 Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8515 Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
8519 Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
4033 Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
20743 Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
6151 Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
6164 Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
8512 Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
7752 Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]
7751 Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]
7753 We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
7074 Man is a useless passion [Sartre]
6687 Man is the desire to be God [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
22228 Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
22233 Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
20755 Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
20760 Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho]
22231 We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8516 Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
8517 Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]