Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Thinking and Experience', 'Philosophy of Language' and 'Approaches to Intentionality'

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25 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
7306 If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
14329 Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
2986 Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
7322 Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2978 Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
9032 Before we can abstract from an instance of violet, we must first recognise it [Price,HH]
9035 If judgement of a characteristic is possible, that part of abstraction must be complete [Price,HH]
9034 There may be degrees of abstraction which allow recognition by signs, without full concepts [Price,HH]
9036 There is pre-verbal sign-based abstraction, as when ice actually looks cold [Price,HH]
9037 Intelligent behaviour, even in animals, has something abstract about it [Price,HH]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7325 Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
2984 Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
9033 Recognition must precede the acquisition of basic concepts, so it is the fundamental intellectual process [Price,HH]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
2979 Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
2987 Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
2977 All thinking has content [Lyons]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
9030 Abstractions can be interpreted dispositionally, as the ability to recognise or imagine an item [Price,HH]
9029 If ideas have to be images, then abstract ideas become a paradoxical problem [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9031 The basic concepts of conceptual cognition are acquired by direct abstraction from instances [Price,HH]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
7324 Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7323 If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
7315 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
7328 The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
7329 Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
7333 The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]