Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Thinking and Experience', 'Essentials of Pragmatism' and 'The Truth in Relativism'

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14 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Before we can abstract from an instance of violet, we must first recognise it [Price,HH]
If judgement of a characteristic is possible, that part of abstraction must be complete [Price,HH]
There may be degrees of abstraction which allow recognition by signs, without full concepts [Price,HH]
There is pre-verbal sign-based abstraction, as when ice actually looks cold [Price,HH]
Intelligent behaviour, even in animals, has something abstract about it [Price,HH]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Recognition must precede the acquisition of basic concepts, so it is the fundamental intellectual process [Price,HH]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Abstractions can be interpreted dispositionally, as the ability to recognise or imagine an item [Price,HH]
If ideas have to be images, then abstract ideas become a paradoxical problem [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
The basic concepts of conceptual cognition are acquired by direct abstraction from instances [Price,HH]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot]