20 ideas
14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
14329 | Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH] |
16980 | We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P] |
16979 | It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P] |
14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
9032 | Before we can abstract from an instance of violet, we must first recognise it [Price,HH] |
9035 | If judgement of a characteristic is possible, that part of abstraction must be complete [Price,HH] |
9034 | There may be degrees of abstraction which allow recognition by signs, without full concepts [Price,HH] |
9036 | There is pre-verbal sign-based abstraction, as when ice actually looks cold [Price,HH] |
9037 | Intelligent behaviour, even in animals, has something abstract about it [Price,HH] |
9033 | Recognition must precede the acquisition of basic concepts, so it is the fundamental intellectual process [Price,HH] |
9030 | Abstractions can be interpreted dispositionally, as the ability to recognise or imagine an item [Price,HH] |
9029 | If ideas have to be images, then abstract ideas become a paradoxical problem [Price,HH] |
9031 | The basic concepts of conceptual cognition are acquired by direct abstraction from instances [Price,HH] |
14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |